Sea-Intelligence

www.Sea-Intelligence.com

Sea-Intelligence Sunday Spotlight

February 7, 2021 – Issue 500

Executive Summary

LA/LB congestion cost 646k slots in 2020-2H **Page 3**

With a 7-day average delay outside LA/LB, capacity equivalent to 646,000 TEU or 7.6% of the Transpacific deployed capacity was 'lost' in 2020-2H, which would have otherwise been in deployment.

2021 will see +20% Y/Y demand growth **Page 12**

As we get into 2021, the extremes of 2020 will render the normal measures of demand growth meaningless. Even 0% growth versus 2019, leads to many regions showing more than 20% Y/Y growth.

Chinese New Year 2021 Blank Sailings Update **Page 18**

Comparing with what was announced in week 53 of 2020, capacity deployment for the three-week Chinese New Year period is currently marginally lower on Transpacific, while lower on Asia-North Europe by a significant 150,000 TEU.

Global Schedule Reliability in FY2020 **Page 25**

Global schedule reliability dropped to 64.0% in FY2020, which was a significant decline to 2019, and a record-low. Hamburg Sued was the most reliable top-15 carrier, while PIL was the least reliable. However, all top-15 carriers recorded a Y/Y decline. 2M continued to be the most reliable carrier alliance, while every major East/West trade lane recorded a schedule reliability Y/Y decline in 2020.

Orderbook does not equal growth ambitions **Page 34**

The orderbook of a carrier is most of the time not a good indication of their growth ambitions – Maersk, MSC and Hapag-Lloyd are the main exceptions to this "rule".

Weekly Indicators

1-7 Feb 2021

Port of NY/NJ

December 2020 Container volumes

709,075 TEU
+21.3% Y/Y

Ports of Seattle/Tacoma

December 2020 Container volumes

301,814 TEU
+6.1% Y/Y

Port of Houston

December 2020 Container volumes

264,626 TEU
+4.3% Y/Y

Port of Montreal

December 2020 Container volumes

139,787 TEU
+3.3% Y/Y

ISSN 2245-9677

Editorial: 500 Issues of the Spotlight

SUNDAY SPOTLIGHT

SEAINTEL MARITIME ANALYSIS

IMPACT OF DECLINING RATES

Barring action, carriers head for 2011 losses

Freight rates have been steadily declining in most trades since the peak in mid-2010. This is no surprise to market observers. However what has not been illustrated as yet is the magnitude of the decline and the possible ramifications on carriers' bottom lines in 2011.

The Shanghai Container Freight Index (SCFI) is one of the most reliable indices available to gauge freight rate developments. The SCFI measures the development in spot rates on main trades out of Shanghai.

TOP-10 CARRIERS COULD LOOSE 13 BILLION USD COMPARED TO 2010 – GIVING ALL A NET LOSS

As the SCFI measures spot rates, this implies that carriers which are mainly exposed to customers shipping on spot rates, or rates following spot rates, will see their rates move largely in the same fashion as the SCFI. Carriers which have a larger proportion of their cargo tied up in contracts will likely see a delayed effect when the spot rates increase – as the contracts makes it difficult for them to increase rates as rapidly as the spot market. Conversely these carriers could also see a mitigating effect when rates go down if they are able to get their contractual customers to stick to the agreed freight rates. Usually, however, this turns out to be problematic for a significant number of carrier-client relationships.

The SCFI measures rates specifically out of Shanghai, however rate levels out of other main ports in Asia will largely follow the same trend. If this was not the case, carriers would quickly re-allocate capacity to favor the higher rates in order to capitalize on the apparent arbitrage opportunity, thereby causing rates to decline and ultimately still to move in unison with the SCFI.

Rates set to decline 865 USD/FFE

We have calculated a main-

WELCOME TO THE SUNDAY SPOTLIGHT

We bid our readers a warm welcome to our newsletter.

Each week we will take a look at developments in the container shipping market. Our focus will be to quantify developments we see in the market, and place the numbers into a context.

We will issue our newsletter each Sunday evening. This will ensure our readers have it fresh in hand as they face a new week.

The topics we elect to cover are chosen purely from the viewpoint that we wish to provide an analytical angle to critical developments in the market. We hope the information will assist our readers to further optimize their business decisions.

March 27, 2011

Welcome to issue number 500 of the Sunday Spotlight. Clearly, the industry has undergone substantial change since our first issues of the Spotlight, but some elements also remain the same. For illustration just a couple of examples from the first few issues in 2011, and their present-day relevance.

In the very first issue, we analysed the impact of the time-delay in the BAF mechanism. At that point in time giving a cash-flow benefit to the shippers of 247M USD, versus the carriers. This phenomenon has not changed, as evidenced by the BAF changes not only in 2020, but also the coming in 2021, as oil prices are increasing. There is no "solution" to this, as a well-functioning BAF has to be grounded in actual prices, and those are – of course – only known after the fact. However, the more frequent the update of the BAF, the less of a cash-flow problem will be the result.

In issue 2 we looked at the game-theoretic impact of pricing behaviour and how this made price wars frequent and destructive amongst the carriers. The "solution" to this would be consolidation and pricing transparency, something which has then to a large degree been achieved in the decade since.

In issue 6 we covered the case of The Containership Company going bankrupt, and how this led to a claim of liquidated damages from the shippers of 23M USD due to shippers not fulfilling MQC terms. Many years later, the court ruled that while this was technically true, the fact that the full 52 weeks of the contracts had not elapsed, shippers could theoretically have chosen to ship all their cargo in the remaining 4 weeks, and hence should not pay. This serves as a good illustration of the contract reform still so desperately needed in the industry, as evidenced in the recent few months.

We are deeply grateful for the many readers that have stayed with from the beginning in 2011, and for the many more that have joined along the past 500 issues, and we hope we can continue to serve you for another 500 issues. We wanted to celebrate this 500th issue, by adding a bit more content this week, but we will return to the regular 3 articles again from next week. We sincerely hope you enjoy this celebratory issue, and we encourage you to share this 500th issue with any business contacts you think would enjoy reading it, and we will also be making this issue freely available on our website.

LA/LB congestion cost 646k slots in 2020-2H

With a 7-day average delay outside LA/LB, capacity equivalent to 646,000 TEU or 7.6% of the Transpacific deployed capacity was 'lost' in 2020-2H, which would have otherwise been in deployment.

There are reports of widespread congestion, not only in North America, but also in North Europe, Asia, and even Australia. However, one of the most impacted port areas seems to be the port complex of Los Angeles and Long Beach (LA/LB).

In this article we will explore the spread of the delays of late vessels in LA/LB, comparing it with previous years as well as the last major crisis to impact the port complex, i.e. the US West Coast labour dispute. In the second section of the analysis, we will calculate the congestion-driven slot loss for the carriers, due to the massive wait times outside of the port. When we say slot loss, we mean the capacity being "soaked up" at anchorage outside of port, which otherwise would have been sailing if there were no delays.

This article is not to put LA/LB under undue scrutiny but is geared more towards analysing the impact of the congestion induced by the massive post-pandemic demand surge, and LA/LB seems the most obvious candidate to study.

Methodology

The data for this analysis is sourced entirely from Sea-Intelligence's industry-leading *Global Liner Performance (GLP)* database, where each month we benchmark schedule reliability of more than 60 named carriers across 34 different trade lanes, based on more than 12,000 monthly vessel arrivals.

As this analysis is focused on late vessel arrivals, we will disregard any vessel arrivals which are 'on-time' or 'early'. Furthermore, in the first section of this analysis, we focus on the spread of late vessel arrivals, for which there were some methodological challenges relating to the most accurate and comprehensible visualisation of the dataset:

1) Since we define 'on-time' as an actual arrival that is +/- 1 calendar day from the scheduled arrival, the dataset has a hard limit, i.e. late vessel arrivals are bound to be arrive more than 1 calendar day after the scheduled arrival. Furthermore, as

the data is also not normally distributed, a normal distribution bell-curve would not have been optimal to visualize the spread of delays. In order to better visualise the delays, we have created a histogram with one day intervals.

2) A histogram presents its own set of problems, in that it is difficult to analyse and visually represent multiple years separately. To overcome this challenge, we have opted to visualise the histogram as a scatter plot without markers and with smooth lines. This enabled us to plot all analysed years into the same chart.

Before we discuss the third challenge, it is imperative that we understand the purpose of the first section of this analysis. The purpose is not to look at how many vessels were late in any given year. Instead, we are more focused at the spread of the lateness of late vessels i.e., when the vessels were late, how late were they and at what frequency.

3) The third challenge was to create a basis of comparison for each year. As the total number of late vessel arrivals in each year differ significantly, comparison between two years can become misleading. For example, in 2018 and 2019, the number of late vessel arrivals that were 2-3 days late was 170 and 155, respectively. The logical conclusion given this information, is that 2018 saw a greater number of late vessels that were 2-3 days late than 2019. This *is* accurate, but slightly misleading in the sense that late vessels that were 2-3 days late as a percentage of the total late vessel arrivals was higher for 2019. We have therefore enforced a level of standardisation, and thus, for each interval we have calculated the number of late vessel arrivals as a percentage of the total late vessel arrivals for that year.

4) The x-axis of charts A1-A3 shows the interval i.e., number of days that the vessel was late, while the y-axis shows the number of late vessels that were late within that interval. For clarity, on what each interval represents, please refer to this example: The x-axis value of 2.0 days contains all late vessel arrivals that were more than 1.0 days late and were less than or equal to 2.0 days late. The interval that is labelled '14+' shows all late vessel arrivals that were at least more than two weeks late.

In the second section of the analysis, we calculate the amount of capacity-equivalent that was lost in 2020-2H, resulting from port congestion and idled vessels in the LA/LB anchorage, waiting for berth windows. To make it easier for our readers to follow the complex methodology along with the charts, we have instead opted to print the methodological considerations for that section along with charts A6 and A7.

Spread of vessel delays in 2020

Figures A1 to A3 shows the spread of the lateness of the late vessel arrivals the respective time periods for 2016-2020. The y-axis shows the frequency of the delay in the number of days, whereas the x-axis shows the delay in the number of days. In simplistic terms, the closer the peak to the y-axis and the higher it is, the lower the average delay of late vessel arrivals across that period.

Fig. A1: Distribution of Late Vessels Annual (LA/LB)



To put 2020 into context, figure A1 shows the spread of the delays across the entire year for the 2016-2020 period. From the figure, it is evident that the delays in 2020 were much higher than in the previous years, as the peak in 2020 is not only lower, but also wider. A wide peak means that the delays were spread across a much wider range. On average in 2016-2019, 66.7% of the late vessels were 1-3 days late. In 2020 however, that percentage was of 41.4%. The only previous year since 2012 with a similar spread of delays was in 2015, which was impacted by the US West Coast labour dispute.

Nearly 26.7% of the late vessels in 2020 were 7-14 days late, with the percentage of late vessels in 2020 the highest across the analysed period in each of those intervals. Furthermore, 3.3% of the late vessels in 2020 were over 14 days late, whereas the previous highest in the analysed period was a measly 0.3%. This was only topped by the 14.0% reached in 2015, which, once again, was due to the US West Coast labour dispute. We will explore the comparison with 2015 in greater detail in figure A3.

Fig. A2: Distribution of Late Vessels Q4 of each year (LA/LB)



Figure A2 zeroes in on the fourth quarters of each year to set a comparison for 2020-Q4, which our data shows recorded the highest cumulative days delay in 2020, and as we know, was also the period with the greatest impact of port congestion. At this point, we would once again like to reiterate that this entire analysis is based on the ports of LA/LB and are not representative of any other region.

The spread of late vessels in 2020-Q4 is even wider than when looking across the entire year. This suggests an even wider spread of delays across the late vessels in 2020-Q4. We can also see that the percentage of vessels that were over 5 days late was consistently highest in the analysed period in all intervals.

In fact, the average percentage of late vessels that were 2-3 days late in the fourth quarters of 2016-2019 was 66.5%, whereas in 2020-Q4, the percentage was extremely low at just 16.4%. What is also worth noting is that in 2016-2019, there were no vessels that were over 14 days late. In 2020-Q4 however, 6.8% of the vessels were over 14 days late.

There is no question in our minds that the vessel delays in 2020, especially in 2020-Q4, exacerbated by port congestion, are unnaturally high. We are of course in uncharted waters here with the Coronavirus outbreak and the subsequent pandemic, the aftermath of which is still being felt on major global trades. However, LA/LB suffered from another exceptional circumstance in 2015: the US West Coast labour dispute, which virtually brough the port to a standstill and resulted in massive port congestion.

Fig. A3: Distribution of Late Vessels 2020-Q4 vs. 2015-Q1 (LA/LB)



As such, figure A3 shows the spread of delays in 2020-Q4 with those in

2015-Q1, i.e. at the height of the labour dispute. Although an argument can be made that comparing Q4 against Q1 is like comparing apples and oranges (which would be true in most Y/Y comparisons), there is little in the way to suggest that the lateness of late vessel arrivals is more impacted in certain months than the other. Therefore, we believe that comparing 2020-Q4 with 2015-Q1 will not be the cause of any bias or misrepresentation of the data.

The data shows that the frequency of delays in both periods in the 1-3 days interval is roughly the same. The first major difference is in the 4-8 days delay interval, where the delays in 2020-Q4 were nearly double of 2015-Q1 in most months. Both time periods once again map out relatively well in the 9-14 days delay interval, after which, we see a sharp spike in the percentage of vessels that were over 14 days late in 2015-Q1.

In short, compared to the port congestion arising from the US West Coast labour dispute, 2020-Q4 saw a higher percentage of vessels that were 4-8 days late, but a significantly lower percentage of vessels with over 14 days of delay. That said, the 2014-2015 US West Coast port labour dispute ended in 2015-Q1, but there are no indications that we are at the end of the Pandemic by now, and we certainly were not at the end of 2020-Q4, so there is certainly a great likelihood that Pandemic impact may become greater than that of the labour dispute, although it did not happen by 2020-Q4

Fig. A4: Average Delay per Vessel Size 2020-Q4 (LA/LB)



Figure A4 is the last chart for this section and shows the average delay in days for each vessel size that was deployed in the fourth quarter of 2020.

You can make the argument that as a carrier, if you have both an 8,000 TEU vessel and a 15,000 TEU vessel waiting outside the port, then you would likely want the 15,000 TEU vessel to go in first, so in that way, in theory, you can make the most customers happy.

However, we can see that this is not the case. From 1,000-15,000 TEU, the chart is basically a square, with the vessels delayed anywhere between 2-14 days,

without there being any preference across vessel sizes whatsoever. There are of course some outliers, but largely speaking, it does not matter if you have a 5,000 TEU or a 10,000 TEU vessel, they are impacted by the port congestion all the same.

No matter how you argue that there might be advantages and disadvantages at different vessel sizes, reality is that the moment a vessel has been delayed, then it does not matter how big or small it is, they are subject to the same amount of delay. This is important to know, because if you are a shipper and you want to go for a particular vessel size because you think you have an advantage, if it gets delayed, then there is no preference.

Lost TEU due to port congestion

Figure A5 starts the second section of this analysis, showing the average number of days lost by a vessel due to the delays caused by port congestion in in each of the fourth quarters in 2016-2020. The y-axis shows the total number of days lost in each fourth-quarter, whereas the data labels show the average number of days lost per vessel call. In 2020-Q4, out of all the vessel calls in LA/LB, 324 distinct vessel calls were marked as 'late' i.e., arrived at berth more than one calendar from the schedule, with a total delay of 2,318 days.

Fig. A5: Avg. Days Lost by Delayed Vessels in Q4 (LA/LB)



This means, that on average, every time a vessel was late into LA/LB, it lost 7.15 days. Which also means that in 2020-Q4, the average transit time (barring any omitted port calls) would have been increased by roughly a week for each service calling LA/LB, if not countered by omitting subsequent ports or speeding up the vessel. To maintain weekly service departures, carriers would have needed to add another vessel to the service, vessels that they do not have at present, as everything that can float is pretty much deployed already.

This is also one of the reasons we see carriers announcing blank sailings, not with the intention of taking out capacity, but because of the lack of available vessels to maintain weekly sailings, due

to massive port congestion. We shall term such blank sailing "Operational Blank Sailings" going forward.

There is an old industry adage that a vessel only makes money while at sea. If a vessel is then spending roughly 7 days at anchorage outside LA/LB, what does this mean for the potential loss of slots, i.e. the 7 days of delay could instead be spent by the vessel sailing and carrying cargo if it were not delayed. To calculate the potential slot loss, we have to first calculate the TEU*Days. TEU*Days is defined as the number of days it takes a vessel to complete one Transpacific round-trip multiplied by the nominal capacity of the vessel.

In simpler terms, if a 10,000 TEU vessel takes 49 days to complete a Transpacific round-trip, then it has spent 490,000 TEU*Days on that trip. That also means that if it is spending 7 idle days, that does not equate to a full round-trip and thus is not equivalent to a loss of 10,000 TEU, but instead a loss equivalent to 70,000 TEU*Days (10,000 TEU x 7 Days). This converts to a TEU loss of 1,429 TEU ((70,000 TEU*Days/ 490,000 TEU*Days) x 10,000 TEU).

This calculation, however, has one flaw. The Transpacific round-trip services two trade lanes: Asia-North America West Coast (Eastbound) and North America West Coast-Asia (Westbound). When using a 49-day round-trip, we are assuming a 1:1 relationship between the utilisation and relative slot cost on both directions.

We know that the relationship is not 1:1 as the utilisation on the back-haul is much lower than that on the head-haul, with the back-haul trade also used to reposition empty containers. In simpler terms, if the cargo carried on the head-haul and the back-haul was roughly equal, a 7-day delay in LA/LB would have an equal impact on the potential slot loss of a carrier. However, since the relationship is not 1:1, the impact of the delay would be higher for the head-haul.

To compensate for this, we have used Transpacific demand data published by Container Trade Statistics (CTS) and calculated the 2015-2019 average share of Transpacific Eastbound as 69%, i.e. on average, 69% of the total Transpacific cargo is North America import cargo. Therefore, instead of using the full round-trip figure of 49 days, we have used the percentage of North American imports, which sets the figure at 34 days. This now means, that a 10,000 TEU vessel delayed for 7 days

has a TEU loss of 2,058 TEU slots on the head-haul.

This also means that we can now directly map the TEU loss against deployed Asia-North America West Coast head-haul capacity. Since our *Trade Capacity Outlook (TCO)* database captures deployed capacity at departure from last port in the origin region, we have adjusted it two weeks forward to match the TEU loss, which is captured at the arrival in LA/LB.

Fig. A6: Capacity Lost 2020-2H (LA/LB)



Figure A6 shows the weekly capacity lost in 2020-2H due to the congestion at LA/LB. The cumulative capacity loss was under 200,000 TEU until week 41, after which we saw a considerable increase in lost capacity as the year went on. By the end of 2020, the carriers had lost the equivalent of 646,000 TEU of capacity.

We need to keep in mind that these figures are for just two ports, and there are reports of significant congestion in the ports in Pacific Northwest as well. All in, the equivalent of lost capacity would be much higher than the 646,000 TEU at just LA/LB. Figure A7 puts this into perspective with respect to the capacity deployed on the Transpacific.

Fig. A7: % Capacity Lost 2020-2H (LA/LB)



Figure A7 shows the weekly percentage of capacity lost in 2020-2H due to the congestion at LA/LB. We can once again see a sharp increase especially in the fourth quarter of 2020. By the end of 2020, carriers had lost the equivalent of 7.6% of the weekly deployed Asia-NAWC capacity. This is the percentage of capacity that would otherwise have been sailing, had it not been sitting idle in an anchorage outside LA/LB.

Conclusion

Looking at the congestion at just Los Angeles/Long Beach (LA/LB) we can see that the delays in the second half of 2020, especially in the fourth quarter, are massive. The average delay for each

vessel that is late at LA/LB is 7.15 days. That is the equivalent of one extra vessel for every service calling LA/LB. It is than hardly any wonder why carriers are blanking sailings, as there are no available vessels that can be re-positioned to serve the Transpacific.

If we look at the equivalent of a slot loss, i.e. the TEU equivalent of the capacity that is lost due to the time vessels spends idle outside the port, carriers lost the equivalent of 646,000 TEU of head-haul capacity in the second-half of 2020, which translates into 7.6% of the deployed Asia-NAWC capacity. And this is just LA/LB. If the reports of congestion in the Pacific Northwest are even close to what we are seeing at LA/LB, then we are talking about the potential slot loss of the equivalent of nearly a million TEU in the second half of 2020, just in the Asia-NAWC trade lane.

2021 will see +20% Y/Y demand growth

As we get into 2021, the extremes of 2020 will render the normal measures of demand growth meaningless. Even 0% growth versus 2019, leads to many regions showing more than 20% Y/Y growth.

This week saw the publication of the December demand data from Container Trade Statistics (CTS), leading to the first full overview of demand developments in 2020.



Figure B1 shows the global demand growth, which basically holds little in the way of surprises, given that we have covered it extensively during 2020. What should be noticed, however, is the slight drop in growth rates in December which may be an indication that we might be getting past the peak impact of the pandemic-induced rush of cargo.

Overall, full-year 2020 saw volumes decline -1.1% globally compared to 2019, but as we have already outlined in previous analysis in the Spotlight, the annual number hides the underlying reality that there was a dramatic shortfall in 2020-1H, which was then almost caught up to in 2020-2H – in turn resulting in the severe bottleneck problems we see in the market presently.

But rather than look back in time, we prefer to look ahead, and anticipate developments – and there is one development which all market stakeholders need to be acutely aware of for the entirety of 2021.

<u>The normal Y/Y way of looking at demand developments will not work in 2021.</u>

It is standard industry practice to measure demand developments as a year-on-year growth rate. This is usually a good approach, as it eliminates the seasonality effects in the market, which would otherwise confuse matters if we were to measure month-on-month or quarter-on-quarter changes instead.

The exception to this is of course the months of January and February, where the changing dates of Chinese New Year effectively means that year-on-year comparisons for the first two months of the year can only meaningfully be done when combining January and February.

But, as is evident from figure B1, if the normal practice is used in 2021, we will be comparing to the extremes shown in figure B1.

Fig. B2: Regional demand growth



And at a more detailed regional level it will be much worse, as some regions have seen even larger deviations in volume over the course of 2020. To illustrate this point, figure B2 exemplifies this by showing the demand growth seen in 2020 for three of the major import regions.

From an average annual perspective, these trades do not exhibit what can be called highly extreme developments. European imports are down 3.8%, South American imports are down 6%, and North American imports are up 4.5%. But compared to the monthly swings seen in figure B2, these growth rates are dwarfed.

This in turn means that the monthly volumes we will see in 2021, will be compared with the monthly volumes in 2020, leading to extreme swings in the year-on-year growth rates.

In order to illustrate the effect, figure B3 shows what we will see in terms of year-on-year demand growth in 2021 under three different scenarios.

Fig. B3: Global
Year-on-year growth 2021



One scenario is extremely conservative – it assumes 0% volume growth compared to 2019. This is essentially a scenario wherein 2020 is seen as a "lost" year in terms of demand growth, and we are back where the market was prior to the pandemic. It should be kept in mind that just before the pandemic hit, the global container markets were indeed at a point, where global demand growth had stalled.

The second scenario assumes 10% demand growth compared to 2019, which equals 4.9% annual growth in 2020 and 2021. This is a quite strong scenario, as 4.9% demand growth over two years would peg the period as the strongest since the financial crisis. An underlying reasoning for this would be the positive benefits of the consumer switch from services to goods, in combination with stimulus packages in many countries.

The third scenario includes 20% growth compared to 2019 equal to 9.5% annual growth. We have to go back to the 1990s and 2000s before the financial crisis to find such growth rates. The scenario is included to accommodate the off chance that the current boom is extended.

Figure B3 shows the year-on-year global demand growth we would see in 2021 under each of these scenarios.

The scenarios can be combined, such that it might be possible to assume for example a high boom in the first few months continuing the trend of late 2020, then gradually moving down to the lower scenarios as 2021 gets along.

Figure B3 shows that even in the most pessimistic scenario – 0% growth versus 2019 – we will see global demand growth of 15% in April and May 2021. If the boom of late 2020 continues, this would instead be demand growth rates of upwards of 25%.

But it is then also worth noticing what will happen in the second part of 2021.

In the 0% scenario, we will see global demand growth turn negative from August and the remainder of the year, and even in the 10% growth scenario – which is a strong scenario in itself – we would see less than 5% Y/Y growth in the period from September to November.

If we then turn our attention to the anticipated year-on-year growth rates at a regional level, the outlook for 2021 becomes even more extreme than the global view.

Figure B4 shows the possible development for North American imports, which enters 2021 on a trajectory in between the two positive scenarios, as December 2020 saw

volumes increase 15% compared to December 2019.



If this strength holds up, we might well see year-on-year growth rates in the range of 20-40% for the first 5 months of 2021. Then we will see growth rates rapidly decline and towards the second half of the year turn negative, even in the 10% scenario. When we get to November demand growth rates will also turn negative in the extreme 20% growth scenario.

Figure B5 shows the possible development for European imports. The end of 2020 saw the region closer to the 0% scenario as December growth rate versus 2019 turned slightly negative after 4 months of positive growth.



In the case of the 0% growth scenario versus 2019 we will head into a Chinese New Year season still showing up to 10% demand growth, and when we get to April and May 2021, this stagnation scenario will nonetheless show almost 25% demand growth. If European import growth increases in the coming month, this growth rate could in the 10% scenario go up to almost 40% in April.

However, the second half of the year would see a rapid decline in the year-on-year growth rates, and although not as severe as for North American imports, it still requires a sustained 10% growth scenario to stay above the zero line.

Figure B6 shows the prospects for South American import growth in 2021 on a year-on-year basis, and this is seen to be even more extreme than for Europe and North America.

Fig. B6: S.America Import
Year-on-year growth 2021



In the pessimistic 0% scenario, the market is on track to show more than 40% demand growth in May when the year-on-year effect peaks. And if the market shows even a modicum of growth compared to 2019, this peak will get even larger.

In the positive 10% scenario we will see the year-on-year demand growth rates for May achieve an astonishing 56% Y/Y. And this is then followed by a significant drop in Y/Y growth rate towards the end of 2021.

In order to illustrate the effect of the spring-spike in demand growth, figure B7 shows the year-on-year growth rates in April 2021 in each of the regions imports and exports, in the pessimistic 0% scenario, where volumes merely equal those shipped in 2019.

The dire consequences of measuring year-on-year demand growth is extremely visible. Despite 0% growth versus 2019 being a negative scenario from a market perspective, all trades show substantial growth – many ranging at the 20% level or above, with exports from the Indian subcontinent and Middle East spiking at more than 45% growth.

Fig. B7: Year-on-Year demand growth April 2021
Scenario: 0% growth versus 2019



Conclusion

The conclusion of this – and the key reason for us performing this specific analysis, at this specific point in time – is that no market participants should use the "normal" Y/Y methodology for assessing demand growth in the container markets in 2021.

A growth rate of more than 20% signals an extreme boom – and growth rates above 40% are downright astronomical. And even though they might make for great headlines – and be mathematically correct – they will be exceedingly misleading in terms of conveying information about the actual state of the market.

The severe volatility in demand in 2020 has very simply rendered it impossible to measure year-on-year demand growth for any of the months in 2021.

All market participants would therefore be well advised, to adopt a different method to gauging the possible strength or weakness of demand growth in 2021, and a reasonable simple starting point would be to measure 2021 growth versus 2019 instead, and then calculate an annualized growth rate based on this.

Chinese New Year 2021 Blank Sailings Update

Comparing with what was announced in week 53 of 2020, capacity deployment for the three-week Chinese New Year period is currently marginally lower on Transpacific, while lower on Asia-North Europe by a significant 150,000 TEU.

In issue 495 of the *Sunday Spotlight*, we offered a comprehensive analysis of the scheduled developments in the 2021 Chinese New Year (CNY) offered capacity against the 2016-2020 period. At that time, we noted that capacity reductions scheduled for 2021 CNY were nowhere near what was seen in the previous years, and amidst the current demand boom and capacity shortages, there was little indication that we would see a slew of blank sailings in the same vein as in earlier years.

As we are now just one week from Chinese New Year, this analysis offers an update on whether additional blank sailings have been announced or whether the carriers are content with the amount announced in week 53 of 2020 (our comparison period). As such, we will use the announcements made in week 53 of 2020 as a reference point, to see what has changed since then. Since the developments up to 2020 were already covered in issue 495 of the *Sunday Spotlight*, we will focus on the changes between week 53 of 2020 and the currently scheduled capacity deployment.

That said, there is one thing that we need to keep in mind. As we pointed out in our analysis in previous weeks, blank sailings do not necessarily result in a capacity reduction. Due to the current congested nature of major ports, the extensive delays are forcing the carriers' hands to announce blank sailings, simply because they cannot maintain weekly departures due to the said delays and are short on available vessels. However, with the deployment of small extra-loaders, we have, in previous weeks, seen some of the trade lanes record substantial capacity growth, despite the announcement of blank sailings.

Methodology

The methodology for this section is similar to the one in the article titled "Chinese New Year Blank Sailings" issued in issue 495 of the Sunday Spotlight. Readers familiar with the

methodology may skip this and head straight to the analysis.

The data for this article has been sourced entirely from Sea-Intelligence's proprietary Trade Capacity Outlook (TCO) database, where each week we track the vessels and capacities deployed across all services on the major deep-sea trade lanes, as well as provide a 12-week outlook for how capacity will unfold, based on named vessel schedules published by the carriers.

This article will focus on the following major East/West trade lanes:

- Asia to North America West Coast (Asia-NAWC)
- Asia to North America East Coast (Asia-NAEC)
- Asia to North Europe (Asia-NEUR)
- Asia to Mediterranean (Asia-MED)

We have chosen to analyse only the head-hauls of these trade lanes as the primary impact of Chinese New Year (CNY) is on cargo going out of Asia.

As CNY is based on the lunar cycle, it falls on a different date every year. This year, Chinese New Year will commence on February 12, which is a Friday, while it fell on a Saturday, Tuesday, Friday, Saturday, and Monday in 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016, respectively. To make the capacity in previous years directly comparable, we have decided to assign the week immediately after Chinese New Year as 'Week 0' in 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2021 while in 2016 and 2019 we have assigned 'Week 0' to the week of Chinese New Year, as it fell (falls) on a Monday and a Tuesday in those respective years.

Further, as the TCO database captures the deployed capacity as vessels leave Asia, which is usually 1-2 weeks after the vessels are scheduled to call ports in China, the brunt of the blank sailings will naturally fall in the weeks we have assigned as "week 1" and "week 2". Therefore, this analysis will focus on the capacity reductions in the three weeks on and after Chinese New Year, i.e., weeks 0 to 2.

As we always highlight in our analyses of capacity forecasts, there is no way to know what the "correct" amount of capacity should be, as that would necessitate a perfect model of demand. Absent such a perfect demand prediction model, it is still possible to gauge whether the currently scheduled capacity deployment seems sensible, by using the capacity reduction rates of previous years as a guide.

However, since this is an update to our initial analysis on Chinese New Year, and since we are only a week away from CNY, we will skip this part of the analysis, as there is no value in stating how much further capacity is expected to be blanked in the coming one week before CNY.

Throughout the analysis, we will compare the currently offered CNY capacity with what was scheduled to be offered for the 2021 CNY period in week 53 of 2020, which is when we initially did the analysis. Please note that we are analysing offered capacity across the same CNY period, just from two different reference points: as it stood on week 53, and as it currently stands.

Figures

Figures C1, C3, C5, and C7 show the deployed capacity on the respective trade lanes, four weeks before and three weeks after Chinese New Year, for the 2016-2020 period, as well as the currently scheduled deployment for 2021. To put into context how much blanked capacity was announced for CNY when we initially did the analysis in week 53 of 2020 and how does the current outlook compare, we have shown the initial outlook as a dotted red line and the current outlook as a solid red line.

Figures C2, C4, C6, and C8, which show the percentage of capacity reduced, have been calculated by assigning the blank sailings a 'capacity' equal to the average of the previous 12 sailings. This value (Blanked Cap) was then added to the offered capacity for the respective week to get the total expected capacity for that week (Total Cap). Percentage of capacity reduced was hence calculated as: (Blanked Cap / Total Cap) * 100%. We have added the same perspective for these figures as well, with the patterned red bars showing the initial outlook and the solid red bars showing the current outlook.

Asia to North America West Coast



As it stands, offered capacity across the eight-week period is still scheduled to be considerably higher than in previous years, although it will be roughly 115,000 TEU lower than what was announced in week 53 of 2020. We can see that the current capacity deployment is slated to be higher in

weeks -2, 1, and 3, and lower in the remaining weeks compared to the announcement in week 53.

The difference in some of the weeks is considerable, at around 40-60,000 TEU. We can also see an upwards trend in the currently offered capacity, with the week +3 capacity slated to be a little over 417,000 TEU. For week 0-2 however, which is where the brunt of Chinese New Year blank sailings are traditionally felt, the difference between the currently scheduled deployment and the week 53 announcement is just 9,000 TEU.

Fig. C2: Asia-NAWC - % Cap Reduced



In week 53, carriers had only announced 3 blank sailings in the week 0-2 period, which equalled 24,300 TEU of blanked capacity, and accounted for just 2.1% of the total 2021 capacity for the three-week period. As it stands, carriers have announced 13 blank sailings for the week 0-2 period, which equals roughly 121,500 TEU and accounts for 9.6% of the total 3-week capacity. The major differences were in weeks +1 and +2, where carriers announced reductions of 13.5% and 8.5% against 4.9% and 0.0%, respectively.

Asia to North America East Coast

Fig. C3: Asia-NAEC - Cap Offered



On Asia-North America East Coast, carriers are currently slated to offer roughly 1.47 million TEU across the eight-week period, which although it is lower than what was announced in week 53 of 2020 by 28,000 TEU, is still higher than in the previous years.

Compared to week 53, the currently scheduled deployment is higher in weeks -3 to 0, whereas it is lower in the remaining weeks. However, after the initial spike in offered capacity in week -3, the currently scheduled deployment is slated to see a decreasing trend until week 2, with that week's offered capacity slated to be 148,200 TEU. The difference between both measurement periods for the week 0-2 period, which is when the biggest impact

of Chinese New Year is traditionally felt, is lower at just 13,300 TEU.

Fig. C4: Asia-NAEC - % Cap Reduced



In week 53, carriers had announced only 2 blank sailings in the week 0-2 period, both of which were slated for week 0. This translated into an 11.1% reduction currently slated for that week. In TEU terms, this capacity reduction equalled 21,000 TEU of capacity or 3.6% of the total week 0-2 capacity.

As it stands now however, 8 blank sailings are currently scheduled for the week 0-2 period, which translates into roughly 94,700 TEU or 14.8% of the total week 0-2 capacity. This development is interesting, because the difference in slated blanked capacity is far higher than the difference in the offered capacity, which suggest that despite a higher number of blank sailings, carriers are still finding ways to ensure that the offered capacity does not drop significantly.

Asia to North Europe

Fig. C5: Asia-NEUR - Cap Offered



From the chart, straight away we can see that the currently offered capacity is considerably lower than what was scheduled to be offered in week 53 in 2020. The difference between the two is a significant 116,500 TEU in favour of the earlier week 53 announcements. According to the current schedules, offered capacity in weeks -1 to 3 will be lower than what was announced in week 53. In the week 0-2 period, where the actual impact of Chinese New Year is felt, offered capacity is at present slated to be even lower than the announcements in week 53, by nearly 150,000 TEU.

Fig. C6: Asia-NEUR - % Cap Reduced



This slated decrease in offered capacity comes as no surprise, as carriers have announced 12 blank sailings compared to 3 in week 53, with a slated capacity reduction in the week 0-2 period of 20.8% compared to just 6.2%, and the TEU reduction of 215,000 TEU compared to 64,000 TEU announced in week 53. The major differences are in weeks 0 and 1, where at present, 25.2% and 25.5%, respectively, is slated to be reduced, compared to the week 53 figure of 6.8% and 5.7%.

Asia to Mediterranean



Of all the analysed trade lanes, Chinese New Year capacity slated to be offered on the Asia-Mediterranean trade lane is the most in line with past years, even during the week 1-3 period. The current capacity deployment for Chinese New Year is 34,000 TEU lower than what was announced for the period in week 53, with the major differences coming in weeks 1-3, aligning the slated 2021 Chinese New Year capacity even more with the historical years. That said, in the week 0-2 period, capacity is currently slated to be offered 52,000 TEU lower than what was announced in week 53.



In week 53, only 4 sailings were slated to be blanked in the week 0-2 period in 2021, with the current outlook standing at 9 blank sailings. In terms of the percentage of capacity reduced, the current outlook will see it increased from 12.3% to 24.1%, with the TEU reductions slated to increase from 56,000 TEU to 110,300 TEU.

The biggest differences are slated to be in weeks 1 and 3, with the percentage reduction increasing from 9.3% to 38.2% in week 1 and from 9.2% to 27.3% in week 3. As stated before, the comparison period is the announcements that were made in week 53 of 2020.

Conclusion

Carriers have only announced 21 blank sailings on the Transpacific and 21 on Asia-Europe in the three-week Chinese New Year (CNY) period. In comparison, a combined 88 sailings were blanked in 2020 (73 if we discount the ones due to Coronavirus), whereas 67 sailings were blanked in this period in 2019.

Fig. A9: % Cap Reduced - 3-Week Avg



If we look at figure C9, we can see that the 2021 are considerably lower than figures than the 2020 (which only includes CNY blank sailings) and the 2016-2019 average, but considerably higher than what we saw announced just 5 weeks ago.

Sao while the conclusion 5 weeks ago was that CNY 2021 was effectively cancelled, at least from a blank sailing perspective, that is no longer the case, and what we are seeing now is a weaker capacity reduction 2021 CNY, *on a relative basis*.

That said, on an *absolute basis,* the amount of capacity deployed on the Transpacific trade lanes far exceeds anything we have seen in the past, so CNY 2021 is still largely cancelled on Transpacific, though less cancelled than 5 weeks ago. For Asia-North Europe, we have seen an increase in the number of announced blank sailings over the 3-week CNY-period since week 53 of 2020, but the traditional significant dip in capacity is still completely absent. Only Asia-Mediterranean matches CNY of previous years, in both relative and absolute terms.

In past years, we would be very critical of the carrier's behaviour, if we had seen the same level of substantial changes in the number of blank sailings and deployed capacity, as we have seen ion the short time frame of 5 weeks since our last analysis. This time though, we are inclined to go a little softer on the carriers, as a large share of the recently announced blank sailings are to a large degree outside of the control of the carriers, as they are largely consequence of the exceptionally high degree congestion experience in large measure on the Transpacific trade but is increasingly becoming a global challenge. We will return to this challenge in more detail in coming issues of the Sunday Spotlight.

Global Schedule Reliability in FY2020

Global schedule reliability dropped to 64.0% in FY2020, which was a significant decline to 2019, and a record-low. Hamburg Sued was the most reliable top-15 carrier, while PIL was the least reliable. However, all top-15 carriers recorded a Y/Y decline. 2M continued to be the most reliable carrier alliance, while every major East/West trade lane recorded a Y/Y decline in schedule reliability in 2020.

Global schedule reliability in 2020-FY dropped to 63.9%, the lowest recorded annual global schedule reliability since Sea-Intelligence introduced the benchmark in late 2011. Furthermore, both metrics of delays (delays for ALL and LATE vessel arrivals) were on a increasing trend, with the average delay for ALL vessel arrivals increased to a record high of 1.66 days, while the average delay for LATE vessel arrivals reached a joint-high of 5.01 days.

All top-15 carriers recorded a Y/Y decline in schedule reliability in 2020, with the most reliable 2020 carrier, Hamburg Süd, scoring "only" 74.1%. On a trade lane level, all six major East/West trade lanes recorded a Y/Y decline in schedule reliability in 2020, with both Asia-Europe trade lanes as well as the Asia-North America West Coast trade lane recording double-digit decreases. Furthermore, both Trans-Pacific trade lanes dropped below the 55% mark for the first time jointly.

While the decline in schedule reliability commenced in 2020-Q1, with industry average dropping to 68.0%, it was 2020-Q3 and especially 2020-Q4 that saw the largest declines, reaching 65.0% and 49.0% respectively. As the January 2021 issue of the *Global Liner Performance (GLP) report* has now been published, we can review these developments in schedule reliability across the entire full year of 2020, to analyse in detail how the 2020-2H decreases were experienced on the global, carrier, alliance, and trade lane levels.

Methodology

The data for this analysis is sourced entirely from Sea-Intelligence's industry-leading *Global Liner Performance (GLP)* database, where each month we benchmark the schedule reliability of more than 60 named carriers across 34 different trade lanes,

based on more than 12,000 monthly vessel arrivals.

According to our methodology, "on time" is defined as actual vessel arrival within plus or minus one calendar day of the scheduled arrival. Each carrier's schedule reliability is based on the schedule reliability of all the deep-sea services that the carrier offers to their customers, including services where the carrier operates some or all of the vessels themselves, and services operated in alliances, through slot charter agreements, or in vessel sharing agreements (VSAs).

Mentioned below are the main East/West trades that are the focus of the trade lane section of the analysis, followed by the number of vessel arrivals that their 2020-FY scores are based on. We refer readers interested in other trade lanes to the monthly *Global Liner Performance (GLP)* report, as it covers 34 global trade lanes in depth.

- Asia – NAWC: 3,37
- Asia – NAEC: 3,587
- Asia – North Europe: 3,411
- Asia – Mediterranean: 3,257
- Transatlantic WB: 5,496
- Transatlantic EB: 6,603

The **global scores** are calculated across all deep-sea services, and not just the trade lanes mentioned above, whereas the alliance scores have been calculated for the above-mentioned trade lanes only.

In the **alliance section** of the analysis, we have opted to do a quarterly analysis instead of a running two-month average, as the new alliance structure has been in place for well over two years now, and year-on-year reference points are now available. There is an overlap in 2017-Q2 between the old and the new alliances (excluding the continuing 2M) as the old alliances did not fully phase out until June 2017. However, there are still more than 500 arrivals in 2017-Q2 for each of the old alliances, so the data is representative**.**

Furthermore, in the alliance section, we have included only the head-haul directions of the trade lanes (the six trade lanes listed above), so westbound for Asia-Europe and eastbound for Transpacific, while we have included both directions of the Transatlantic trade, as it is a somewhat balanced trade. Furthermore, the industry average includes all of the services – both alliance and non-alliance – that are offered in the six mentioned trade lanes.

In the **trade lane section** of the analysis, we have chosen to only highlight carriers that have more than 52 arrivals on a trade lane in 2019-FY. Choosing 52 arrivals across the year ensures that there is at least 1 arrival per week for a respective carrier. Please note that the trade lane industry scores include all carriers and are not affected by this methodological choice.

Please note that we have, in some places, abbreviated 'Percentage Point' as 'PP' for ease of readability.

Global schedule reliability in 2020

Before diving into detail on the developments in 2020, let us take a quick look at some of the high-level metrics for 2020.



Figure D1 shows the high-level development of the full-year global schedule reliability in the period 2013-2020.

Prior to 2020, the lowest recorded FY schedule reliability in the analysed period was in 2018 with 70.7%.

In 2020, schedule reliability reached its all-time worst result of 63.9%, coming down Y/Y from 2019-FY of 78.0%, i.e. a drop of 14.1 percentage point.



Drilling down, Figure D2 shows the global schedule reliability for the same 2013-2020 period but on quarterly basis. In 2020-Q4, global schedule reliability reached 49.0% or 29.4 percentage points lower than in the corresponding quarter last year. While schedule reliability in 2020-1H was more or less on par with previous years (although still lower than 2019-1H), there has been a massive decline as of 2020-Q3. Schedule reliability dropped Y/Y in both 2020-Q3 and 2020-Q4 by -9.1 and -16.0 percentage points, respectively.

Fig. D3: Global Schedule Reliability - Monthly



And when drilling further down to monthly level, as per figure D3, it becomes painfully clear that the decline in global schedule reliability commenced in August 2020. Until then, 2020 was M/M in the vicinity of 2018 and 2019, also when it came to the monthly trendline. However, as of August 2020, global schedule reliability experienced a steep decline, with December 2020 being reported as 44.6% as the lowest monthly global schedule reliability figure on record.

Fig. D4: Y/Y change in Global Schedule Reliability



Figure D4 shows the monthly Y/Y change in schedule reliability for 2020, compared to both 2018 and 2019.

While schedule reliability in 2020 has generally been lower than 2019 in all months, figure A4 shows that when comparing to 2018, schedule reliability in 2020-H1 (except for February) was higher than 2018-H1. Only from August and onwards did the schedule reliability in 2020 deteriorate, also compared to 2018.

Carrier schedule reliability in 2020

Figures A5 (Top-15 carriers) and A6 (Niche carriers) break down schedule reliability on a carrier level in FY2020, with the last column showing the Y/Y changes. Both tables are colour-coded from green to red, with green being the highest and red being the lowest Y/Y schedule reliability change. Furthermore, both tables are sorted in descending order of the schedule reliability in FY2020.

Fig. D5: Global Schedule Reliability in 2020 (Top15)

Top 14 Carriers	2019-FY	2020-FY	Y/Y
Hamburg Süd	86.1%	74.1%	-12.1%
APL	81.8%	73.6%	-8.2%
Maersk Line	83.5%	70.4%	-13.1%
MSC	81.3%	66.3%	-15.0%
Zim	81.1%	65.3%	-15.8%
CMA CGM	78.9%	64.9%	-14.0%
Wan Hai	88.3%	64.3%	-24.0%
Hapag-Lloyd	76.6%	63.6%	-13.1%
Evergreen	80.2%	62.9%	-17.3%
COSCO	79.6%	62.5%	-17.0%
HMM	83.4%	61.4%	-22.0%
OOCL	78.2%	61.0%	-17.2%
ONE	74.4%	57.0%	-17.4%
Yang Ming	70.8%	54.9%	-15.8%
PIL	75.4%	54.8%	-20.6%

It should be noted that from October 2020, APL has withdrawn from most deep-sea trade lanes, with CMA CGM now being the commercial entity operating in those trades, so we have reduced our top-15 ranking to a top-14 ranking, with APL included with the Niche Carriers from October 2020. We have still included APL with the top-15 carriers when looking at FY2020, as APL was a deep-sea carrier for most of the year, although it should be noted that global schedule reliability got progressively worse throughout 2020, so this may positively bias APL's top-15 carriers score, as only the first 9 months are included with all deep-sea services.

Hamburg Süd was the most reliable top-15 carrier in 2020 with a schedule reliability of 74.1%, followed by APL (73.6%) and Maersk Line (70.4%). No other carriers had schedule reliability higher than 70%. PIL and Yang Ming were the least reliable carriers in 2020, both reported schedule reliability just below 55%.

That being said, all top-15 carriers reported a decline in FY2020 schedule reliability vs FY2019, with 14 of the top 15 carriers recording a double-digit Y/Y decline with Wan Hai (-24.0%), HMM (-22.0%) and PIL (-20.6%) recording the largest declines in schedule reliability in 2020.

Figure A6 shows the schedule reliability of the top-14 carriers for 2020-Q4 vs 2019-Q4 (for 2020-Q4, APL has been removed, as they were reclassified as a niche carrier in October 2020). The carriers in figure A6 are sorted in descending order of their schedule reliability in 2020-Q4.

Fig. D6: 2020-Q4 Reliability - (Top14)



Hamburg Süd was again the most reliable top-14 carrier in 2020-Q4, with schedule reliability of 58.8%, followed by Maersk Line with 56.0%. Only CMA CGM and MSC also had a schedule reliability figure higher than 50.0% in 2020-Q4. At the other end of the table, HMM recorded a schedule reliability of

33.9% for 2020-Q4, closely followed by Yang Ming (34.8%) and ONE (37.2%)

Looking now at figure D7, ICL was the most reliable niche carrier in 2020 with a schedule reliability of 100%, closely followed by Dole Ocean (98.5%) and Great White Fleet (96.9%). An additional two niche carriers had schedule reliability above 90%. The least reliable niche carrier in 2020 was Linea Messina with schedule reliability of 13.9%. No other niche carrier had schedule reliability of less than 25%.

There were 12 niche carriers that recorded a Y/Y improvement in schedule reliability, led by Seaboard Marine (25.5 PP), Wallenius-Wilhelmsen (13.7 PP) and Turkon Line (12.8 PP).

For 5 niche carriers we do not have a 2019 reference points (for various reasons) for comparison, while the remaining niche carriers all reported a Y/Y decline in schedule reliability, with Interasia (-38.0 PP), Global Feeder Shipping (-37.6 PP) and Pendulum Express Line (-36.3 PP) accounting for the largest decreases.

Fig. D7: Global Schedule Reliability in 2020 (Niche)

	2019-FY	2020-FY	Y/Y Change
ICL	96.1%	100.0%	3.9%
Dole Ocean	98.7%	98.5%	-0.1%
Great White Fleet		96.9%	N/A
WEC Lines	93.5%	94.4%	1.0%
Geest Line	90.5%	94.2%	3.7%
Marfret	89.1%	89.1%	0.0%
Seaboard Marine	61.3%	86.7%	25.5%
Seatrade	88.8%	85.1%	-3.7%
Westwood Shipping	83.6%	83.4%	-0.1%
Eimskip	76.4%	76.9%	0.5%
ACL	69.0%	73.7%	4.7%
Streamlines	77.7%	72.1%	-5.6%
Matson	76.7%	69.1%	-7.6%
Wallenius-Wilhelmsen	54.9%	68.5%	13.7%
CULines	85.7%	67.3%	-18.4%
DAL	62.9%	65.2%	2.3%
FESCO	81.3%	64.7%	-16.6%
Safmarine	78.0%	63.5%	-14.5%
Simatech	83.2%	62.0%	-21.2%
S.C. India	82.3%	61.9%	-20.5%
Samudera	80.1%	61.7%	-18.4%
X-Press Feeders	85.0%	60.3%	-24.7%
Global Feeder Shipping	97.2%	59.6%	-37.6%
King Ocean	66.7%	58.8%	-7.9%
RCL	84.1%	56.8%	-27.4%
TS Lines	80.6%	56.7%	-23.8%
Bengal Tiger Line	76.5%	55.8%	-20.8%
Cargo Gulf		55.3%	N/A
ANL	76.3%	55.3%	-21.0%
KMTC	77.8%	54.6%	-23.2%
Pendulum Express Line	90.3%	53.9%	-36.3%
NileDutch	74.5%	53.8%	-20.7%
Emirates	77.2%	53.4%	-23.8%
Heung-A	85.8%	52.0%	-33.8%
Sinokor	83.6%	52.0%	-31.6%
Sinotrans	77.6%	51.6%	-26.0%
Interasia	89.3%	51.4%	-38.0%
GSL	77.5%	51.0%	-26.5%
UAFL	50.0%	48.7%	-1.3%
LG Container Lines		45.5%	N/A
Grimaldi	40.5%	45.4%	4.9%
SM Line	77.1%	44.8%	-32.3%
Turkon Line	30.6%	43.3%	12.8%
PDL	66.2%	39.2%	-27.0%
Swire	67.3%	38.5%	-28.8%
OEL	33.8%	35.6%	1.8%
Safeen Feeders		30.8%	N/A
Marguisa	61.1%	29.8%	-31.3%
ARRC	26.4%	28.2%	1.8%
Arkas Line	47.6%	26.5%	-21.1%
Melfi Marine		25.0%	N/A
Linea Messina	22.6%	13.9%	-8.7%

Alliance schedule reliability in 2020

Fig. D8: Alliance Schedule Reliability



Alliance	2019-FY	2020-FY	Y/Y Change	Diff. From Industry (2019)
2M	80.3%	70.6%	-9.7%	6.2%
Ocean	75.2%	61.4%	-13.8%	1.1%
TA	66.6%	60.5%	-6.1%	-7.5%

Figure D8 shows the quarterly total alliance schedule reliability for the six major East/West trades from 2015-Q1 onwards. The dotted red line shows the industry average across all alliance and non-alliance services, totalled across the six trade lanes. The table in figure A8 shows the Y/Y changes in schedule reliability for the three alliances for FY2020, as well as their difference from the FY2020 industry average.

In each quarter of 2020, 2M's schedule reliability was higher than the industry average, while THE Alliance's schedule reliability was below the industry average except for 2020-Q4, where they were on par with industry average. Schedule reliability for Ocean Alliance was lower than the industry average in all but 2020-Q, where they were slightly higher

2M was the most reliable carrier alliance in 2020, with schedule reliability of 70.6%, followed by Ocean Alliance with 61.4%, and THE Alliance with 60.5%. While all three carrier alliances recorded a Y/Y decline in schedule reliability, only Ocean Alliance recorded a double-digit decline (13.8 PP). And both THE Alliance and Ocean Alliance scored below the industry average on the six East/West trades in 2020-FY.

2020 Trade lane schedule reliability

Figure D9 below provides a long-term perspective on the quarterly developments in schedule reliability on the six major East/West trade trades, as well as the global average since 2012-Q1.

Fig. D9: Trade Lane Quarterly Performance





As per figure D10, all six trade lanes recorded a massive Y/Y decline in schedule reliability in 2020-Q4, with only the Trans-Atlantic trade lane declines being less than 40 percentage points. Only Trans-Atlantic WB had a schedule reliability above 50.0%, while the two Transpacific trade lanes both recorded schedule reliability below 30.0%

Global average delay in 2020

Figure D11 shows the global average delay for ALL and LATE vessel arrivals. There is a very important distinction between the two: delay for ALL vessel arrivals encompasses all vessel arrivals, irrespective of whether they are early, on-time (our definition of on-time is +/- 1 day, so a vessel that is 1 day late, is still counted as on-time as per our methodology), or late i.e. more than 1 calendar day late. The average delay for LATE vessel arrivals on the other hand, is the delay across only those vessels that are counted as 'late' i.e. arriving more than 1 calendar day after the scheduled date.



The average delay for LATE vessel arrivals has been on an upwards trend since the lowest recorded delay (across the analysed period) of 3.19 days in 2016. As per 2020, the average delay for LATE vessel arrivals crossed the 5 days mark (5.01 days) for the first time across the analysed period. This basically means that vessels that are late, are getting increasingly late on average.

The average delay for ALL vessel arrivals picked up the increasing trend it has had since 2016 (only 2019 saw a decline Y/Y) and increased to the highest point in the analysed period, 0.82 days in 2019 to 1.66 days in 2020.

If we focus on the LATE vessels only, and look at monthly development in the period of 2018-2020 (as per figure D12), it is clear that LATE vessel arrivals has

been above 2019 every month, and with a steady increasing trend since August. In December 2020, LATE vessel arrivals reached a record high of 5.74 days, having effectively crossed the 5.0 days mark in 5 months of 2020.



Conclusion

Global average schedule reliability in 2020 was 63.9%, which was the lowest global average schedule reliability figure recorded since Sea-Intelligence introduce this benchmark. It was a significant decline from the 78.0% recorded in 2019.

With schedule reliability plummeting, the global average delay for ALL vessel arrivals deteriorated Y/Y, increasing to 1.66 days in 2020. And likewise, the average delay for LATE vessel arrivals increased Y/Y to 5.01 days, which is the highest recorded annual average delay for LATE vessels. This means that the vessel arrivals that are late, have also become increasingly late. In fact, December 2020 alone saw an increase to 5.74 days for LATE vessels

Hamburg Süd was the most reliable carrier in 2020, with schedule reliability of 74.1%, followed by APL and Maersk Line with 73.6% and 70.4% respectively.

THE Alliance members continue to struggle with schedule reliability, as THE Alliance is the least reliable carrier alliance in 2020, however they have closed in on the gap to Ocean Alliance, who recorded a nearly 14.0 percentage points Y/Y decline in schedule reliability.

All six major East/West trade lanes recorded a Y/Y deteriorating trend in schedule reliability, ranging from -4.2 percentage points (Trans-Atlantic EB) to -16.8 percentage points (Asia-North Europe) compared to 2019-FY. However, especially 2020-Q4 saw a huge drop in schedule reliability, ranging from -47.7 percentage points (Asia-North America West Coast) to -25.1 percentage points (Trans-Atlantic EB) when compared to 2019-Q4.

Orderbook does not equal growth ambitions

The orderbook of a carrier is most of the time not a good indication of their growth ambitions – Maersk, MSC and Hapag-Lloyd are the main exceptions to this "rule".

Evergreen just ordered a batch of another twenty 15.000 TEU vessels. In raw numbers, this means their orderbook now equals almost 60% of their operated fleet.

Or to put it in a different context: Evergreen is the world's 7th largest carrier, and the capacity of their orderbook alone equals the full operating size of the world's 8th largest carrier, HMM.

Or, yet another context: Adding their orderbook to their existing fleet would lead them to surpass both ONE and Hapag-Lloyd, to become the world's 5th largest carrier.

However, whilst the above is mathematically true, it would not necessarily be an accurate reflection of the market dynamics, which are about to unfold.

The unspoken assumption in the above mathematical exercise is that a carrier will add their new vessels to their existing fleet, and hence that the orderbook is a reflection of their growth ambition. And this unspoken assumption would quickly lead to the conclusion that we might be on the brink of yet another freight rate war, as a major carrier needs to grow their volume.

But let us stop to think for a second. This is certainly not the first time Evergreen – or other carriers – have fielded very large orderbooks relative to their fleet size. But did these orders in reality lead to a similar growth in their fleet, once they were delivered? This is the question we will be exploring.

Methodology

The starting point is data related to the 12 largest carriers today, and their fleet sizes as well as orderbooks, at the beginning of each year from 2007 to 2021.

We can then – quite simply – look at the magnitude of the orderbook of a carrier in the beginning of each year and then see how the carrier has grown a couple of year later.

Of course, delivery times for vessels vary, but as a rule of thumb, they tend to be delivered within 2 years of being

ordered. We can therefore start from the hypothesis that if a carrier has an orderbook equal to 10% of their fleet size, then the same carrier will be 10% larger after 2 years, if the orderbook is in fact a reflection of their growth ambition.

When performing this analysis at a carrier level, we need to take a methodological problem into account: Growth through mergers and acquisitions.

Many carriers have grown substantially in the period from 2007 to 2021 as a consequence of mergers, and this growth is of a magnitude that will at times "drown out" the effect of the new vessels.

We have therefore chosen the following methodology:

The carriers being analysed are the 12 largest carriers as per January 2021. In terms of their historical fleet size, as well as orderbook, we have retroactively combined them with the other carriers they have absorbed over time.

Whilst this skews the view that a single carrier makes decisions on their own behalf, it does remove the methodological problem of the size jumps from acquisitions. And methodologically speaking, it means that we can effectively analyse our main question in terms of whether an orderbook in reality is a good measure of a carrier's future expected growth.

In practical terms this means the following for the whole period 2007-2021:

- Maersk includes Hamburg Süd and CCNI (as CCNI was acquired by Hamburg Süd)
- COSCO includes OOCL and CSCL
- CMA CGM includes Containerships OY, APL, OPDR and Cheng Lie Navigation
- Hapag Lloyd includes UASC and CSAV
- ONE includes NYK, MOL and K-Line
- PIL includes Mariana Express Lines

The actual analysis

Figures C1a-C1l shows the development for each of the 12 carriers being analysed. The orange line in each of the graphs shows the magnitude of the orderbook for each carrier at the beginning of each year.

The blue line shows the actual growth of the carrier's fleet two years later. The blue line has then been shifted to 2 years

earlier, in order to be able to directly compare the size of the orderbook with the resultant growth in fleet size.

As a simple example, Evergreen had an orderbook equal to 20% of their fleet in January 2007. By January 2009, their fleet had grown 14%. In figure C1g this is then shown as 20% on the orange line in 2007 and 14% on the blue line also in 2007.

This time shift is of course the reason why there is not data depicted on the blue lines for 2020 and 2021, as this requires information related to each carrier's actual size in January 2022 and January 2023.

If the blue and orange lines roughly track each other, it means that the orderbook to a significant degree is a reflection of the carrier's actual growth ambitions.

Looking at the graphs for each of the 12 carriers, there are only three showing substantial overlap across the entire period: Maersk, MSC and Hapag-Lloyd. Naturally, there is volatility in the sense that the development does not match perfectly – especially Hapag-Lloyd shows a large deviation in 2011, but this is driven by the dramatic swings in the fleet of CSAV in the wake of the Chilean carrier's failed attempt at rapid growth, following the financial crisis.

The other 9 carriers show a development where most often their actual growth is substantially less than the growth indicated by their orderbooks. This is particularly the case for COSCO, CMA CGM, ONE (or in reality the combination of NYK, MOL and K-Line), Yang Ming and ZIM.

For the remainder, this is a mix between growing in line with the orderbook, or less than the orderbook.

What this in turn means is that the majority of the top carriers act as net contributors of capacity to the remainder of the market. They order new vessels, but cascade some of their existing vessels (owned as well as chartered) back into the market.

Another way to look at the development systematically from a market perspective, is to take each data point for each carrier for each year, and place them on a scatterplot, as done in figure C2.

Each data point in figure C2 represents a specific carrier's combination of orderbook size and subsequent fleet growth two years later.

The red line in figure C2 represents the trend through all the data points.

Fig.C2: Orderbook versus actual growth after 2 years



If carriers purely ordered vessels in a reflection of their own growth ambitions, the order size should actually match the fleet growth – a development reflected in figure C2 by the black line.

It is very clear from the graph that almost all data points are below the black line, and that the "red" trend has a slope which is considerably less than the black line.

What this means, is that looking at a carrier's orderbook cannot be taken as a sign of that particular carrier's growth ambitions, with the possible exceptions of Maersk, MSC and Hapag-Lloyd.

In general, a large orderbook should more be seen as a sign of fleet renewal than of growth ambitions – although exceptions naturally happen once in a while.

Fig.C1a: Maersk



Fig.C1b: MSC



Fig.C1c: COSCO



Fig.C1d: CMA-CGM



Fig.C1e: Hapag-Lloyd



Fig.C1f: ONE



Fig.C1g: Evergreen



Fig.C1h: HMM



Fig.C1i: Yangming



Fig.C1j: Zim



Fig.C1k: Wan Hai



Fig.C1l: PIL



Relative size of orderbook

Growth 2 years later (shifted 2 years back)

Carrier Service Changes

Wan Hai to launch two new Transpacific services

Effective mid-March 2021, Wan Hai will launch two new Transpacific services to connect Asia to North America West Coast. In addition, the carrier will revise the port rotation of their existing AA1-service, which also connects Asia to North America West Coast. Please find below an overview of Wan Hai's planned changes.

AA1: this service connects Asia to North America West Coast. Effective mid-March 2021, Wan Hai will revise the port rotation of the service, by dropping the port call at Hong Kong. The service will be operated by Wan Hai, and the carrier will brand it "AA1". There will be six vessels deployed on the service, with an average vessel capacity of 5,600 TEU.

The revised port rotation of the service will be as follows *(4 port calls)*:

Shanghai – Ningbo – ~~**Hong Kong**~~ – Long Beach – Shanghai.

The revised port rotation will take effect in mid-March 2021. The first vessel with the revised rotation is to be announced.

AA3: Wan Hai will launch this service in March 2021 to connect Asia to North America West Coast. The service will be operated by Wan Hai, and the carrier will brand it "AA3". Wan Hai have yet to reveal the number of vessels and their capacities on the service.

The port rotation of the service will be as follows *(8 port calls)*:

Haiphong – Cai Mep – Hong Kong – Yantian – Xiamen – Long Beach – Shekou – Haiphong.

The first vessel on the service is to be announced.

AA4: Wan Hai will launch this service in March 2021 to connect Asia to North America West Coast. The service will be operated by Wan Hai, and the carrier will brand it "AA4". Wan Hai have yet to reveal the number of vessels and their capacities on the service.

The port rotation of the service will be as follows *(7 port calls)*:

Kaohsiung – Yantian – Shanghai – Ningbo – Seattle – Oakland – Kaohsiung.

The first vessel on the service is to be announced.

Maersk to revise the port rotation of fortnightly Transpacific service

Effective March 2021, Maersk will revise the port rotation of the TP Alaska-service, which is a fortnightly service connecting Asia to North America West Coast, by adding a port call at Vancouver. The service is operated by Maersk, and the carrier brands it "TP Alaska". There will be three vessels deployed on the service, with an average vessel capacity of 3,500 TEU. Please note: **Underlined** ports indicate newly added port calls, while ~~**strikethrough**~~ denote a dropped port call.

The revised port rotation of the service will be as follows *(6 port calls)*:

Busan – Qingdao – **Vancouver** – Dutch Harbor – Yokohama – Busan.

The first vessel with the revised rotation will be "Express Argentina", which is due to depart from Busan on March 4th.

2M will temporarily revise the port rotation of Mediterranean North America East Coast service

Effective late February 2021, 2M will temporarily revise the port rotation of the TA6/MEDGULF-service, by adding a port call at Marsaxlokk, and dropping the port call at Gioia Tauro. The temporarily revised port rotation is expected to be in effective for 3 months. The service will be operated by Maersk (TA6) and MSC (MEDGULF), while Hamburg Süd (MMGX) will be slot charterers. There will be eight vessels deployed on the service, with an average vessel capacity of 7,700 TEU.

The temporarily revised port rotation of the service will be as follows *(19 port calls)*:

Algeciras – Barcelona – ~~**Gioia Tauro**~~ – **Marsaxlokk** – Naples – La Spezia – Barcelona – Valencia – Algeciras – Sines – Freeport – Miami – Veracruz – Altamira – Houston – New Orleans – Miami – Freeport – Sines – Algeciras.

The first vessel with the temporarily revised rotation will be "MSC Toronto", which is due to depart from Algeciras on March 20th.

The last vessel with the temporarily revised rotation is to be announced.

MSC to revise the port rotation of Mediterranean-North America East Coast services

Effective February 2021, MSC will revise the port rotation of the Canada Express 1 and Canada Express 2-services, both of which connect Mediterranean to North

America East Coast. Please find below MSC's planned changes.

Canada Express 1: this service connects Mediterranean to North America East Coast. Effective February 2021, MSC will revise the port rotation of the service, by dropping the port calls at Valencia and Gioia Tauro, and adding port calls at Naples and Marsaxlokk. The service will be operated by MSC, and the carrier will brand it "Canada Express 1". There will be five vessels deployed on the service, with an average vessel capacity of 4,400 TEU.

The revised port rotation of the service will be as follows *(7 port calls)*:

Genoa – ~~**Valencia**~~ – Sines – Montreal – **Marsaxlokk** – **Naples** – ~~**Gioia Tauro**~~ – Livorno – Genoa.

The revised rotation will take effect in February 2021. The first vessel with the revised rotation is to be announced.

Canada Express 2: this service connects Mediterranean to North America East Coast. Effective February 2021, MSC will revise the port rotation of the service, by dropping the port call at Sines, and adding a port call at Barcelona, as well as a second, Eastbound port call at Halifax. The service will be operated by MSC, and the carrier will brand it "Canada Express 2". There will be four vessels deployed on the service, with an average vessel capacity of 5,000 TEU.

The port rotation of the service will be as follows *(6 port calls)*:

Valencia – ~~**Sines**~~ – Halifax – Montreal – **Halifax** – **Barcelona** – Valencia.

The revised rotation will take effect in February 2021. The first vessel with the revised rotation is to be announced.

Hamburg Süd/Hapag-Lloyd/ANL to temporarily revise the port rotation of North America West Coast-Oceania service

Effective mid-February 2021, Hamburg Süd, Hapag-Lloyd and ANL will temporarily revise the port rotation of the Oceania PANZ/WSN/PCX-service, by adjusting the port call at Auckland from weekly to fortnightly. The temporarily revised port rotation will be in effect until late April 2021. The service will be operated by Hamburg Süd (Oceania PANZ), Hapag-Lloyd (WSN) and ANL (PCX), while MSC (Oceania Loop 1) will be slot charterers. There will be nine vessels deployed on the service, with an average vessel capacity of 4,500 TEU.

The temporarily revised rotation of the service will be as follows *(8 port calls)*:

Oakland – Long Beach – Auckland **(fortnightly)** – Sydney – Melbourne – Adelaide – Tauranga – Oakland.

The first vessel with the temporarily revised rotation will be "JPO Libra", which is due to depart from Oakland on February 19th.

The last vessel with the temporarily revised rotation will be "Seaspan Hamburg", which is due to depart from Oakland on April 25th.

CNC-Line to charter slots on Intra-Asia service

Effective late February 2021, CNC-Line will start to charter slots on the JTK3-service, which connects Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia. The service is operated by T.S. Lines, and the carrier brands it "JTK3". Effective late February 2021, CNC-Line will join the service as slot charterers, and brand it "JTV". There will be three vessels deployed on the service, with an average vessel capacity of 1,000 TEU.

The port rotation of the service will be as follows *(12 port calls)*:

Osaka – Kobe – Moji – Busan – Kwangyang – Keelung – Taichung – Hong Kong – Shekou – Xiamen – Keelung – Osaka.

The first vessel with CNC-Line on board the service as slot charterers will be "Marcliff", which is due to depart from Osaka on February 23rd.

Carrier Rate Announcements









*Hapag-Lloyd: 2 PSS


North Europe-Caribbean/Central America/WCSA (WB) - Effective March 1, 2021
USD/TEU
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
75
100
100
Hamburg Süd (PSS)
CMA CGM (PSS)
Maersk (PSS)


ISC/MEA-North America (EB) - Effective February 7, 2021
USD/FFE
700
600
500
300
200
100
0
300
600
600
Maersk
Hapag-Lloyd (Effective February 15, 2021)
Hapag-Lloyd (Effective March 1, 2021)


Mediterranean-Central America/Caribbean/WCSA (WB) - Effective February 15, 2021
USD/TEU
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
150
150
200
300
Hapag-Lloyd (PSS, amount in EUR/TEU, Effective March 2, 2021)
CMA CGM (PSS, amount in EUR/TEU, Effective March 1, 2021)
Hapag-Lloyd (PSS only from Turkey and Greece)
CMA CGM (PSS)


ISC-North Europe (WB) - Effective February 15, 2021
PLEASE NOTE: BLUE BARS REPRESENT RATE LEVELS
USD/TEU
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
700
2312
CMA CGM (PSS)
Hapag-Lloyd (Only Nhava Sheva to Rotterdam)*
*Hapag-Lloyd: 10 rate levels


ISC-Mediterranean (WB) - Effective February 15, 2021
USD/TEU
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
700
2322
CMA CGM (PSS)
Hapag-Lloyd (Only Nhava Sheva to Genoa)*
*Hapag-Lloyd: 10 rate levels



Trade lane	Carrier	Rate increase	Effective date
ISC-MEA (WB)	Hapag-Lloyd	100 USD/TEU	February 9, 2021
Mediterranean-West Africa (SB)	CMA CGM	150 USD/TEU*	February 15, 2021
India-West Africa (WB)	Hapag-Lloyd	200 USD/TEU	February 15, 2021
East Africa - ISC/MEA (EB)	CMA CGM	100 USD/TEU	February 18, 2021
Asia-East Africa (SB)	COSCO	300 USD/TEU	February 22, 2021
		**PSS*	
Trade lane	**Carrier**	**Rate level**	**Effective date**
North Europe-West Africa (SB)	CMA CGM	1320 USD/TEU	February 15, 2021
MEA-Mediterranean (NB)	Hapag-Lloyd	1519 USD/TEU	February 15, 2021
MEA-North Europe (NB)	Hapag-Lloyd	2332 USD/TEU	February 15, 2021

Sea-Intelligence Reports & Products

Global Liner Performance Report – New January 2020 Report Available

The Liner Industry's most comprehensive report on Liner Schedule Reliability

- 1.1 million vessel arrivals, across 400+ different ports, and 500+ Loops/Services
- Global schedule reliability based on more than 12,000 distinct vessel arrivals per month
- Schedule reliability for 34 trade lanes, split by 60+ named carriers and broken down across individual loops/services
- Average delay for all vessel arrivals and for late vessels arrivals, across all trade lanes

The monthly report contains 116 detailed pages with tables and graphs, quantifying carrier performance at a detailed level, ranging from global to trade lane to service.

12-month subscription: 2,000 Euro. Single issue: 500 Euro.

Order at: info@sea-intelligence.com - Contact us for specialized reliability analysis based on our database.

PORT OVERVIEW AFRICA

Trade Capacity Outlook Report

In-depth weekly report, providing detailed overview of actual capacity offered in the main trade lanes for the coming 12 weeks. The outlook is based on the detailed sailing schedules combined with information of service changes and blanking of sailings. You can pro-actively identify weeks of capacity shortages as well as weeks of excess capacity inflow and plan accordingly.

- 19 Trade lanes covered
- Year-on-year changes as well as week-on-week changes
- Data broken down into named main carriers and alliances

Annual subscription: 2,250 Euro. Order at: info@sea-intelligence.com

Port-to-Port Schedule Reliability

Detailed fact sheets providing schedule reliability information at a carrier/service level for your chosen port-port pair. The fact sheet includes:

- Monthly data series for the past 6 years
- Data broken down by carrier and service
- On-time reliability based on arrival +/- 1 day from schedule
- Average number of days late for late vessels
- More than 10,000 port-pairs are covered.

Fact Sheet price: 100 Euro. 10 Sheets: 900 Euro. Monthly subscriptions and larger packages are available on request.

Order at: info@sea-intelligence.com

Mystery Shopper

Do you know which experience new prospective customers get when they contact you? Are you sure, that the experience is what you intend it to be? If not, Sea-Intelligence can provide you the real picture from a new customer point of view.

- The approach is anonymous
- Results are only provided to senior management and is kept confidential
- Standard test is completed within 4 weeks

Test of 5 locations: 700 Euro. Test of 20 locations: 2500 Euro. Order at: info@sea-intelligence.com

Tailor-Made Analysis

Our core belief is that anything in this industry can be analysed – and analysed well. However, the solution to a particularly difficult problem often rests in the ability to think out of the box and develop new analytical viewpoints. Doing this is our key strength.

At Sea-Intelligence we have a combination of extensive practical industry experience, combined with strong academic analytical skills. We have served a wide range of customers looking to gain insights into the container shipping industry including:

- Container carriers
- Freight forwarders
- Financial institutions
- Cargo owners
- Ports
- IT companies
- Equipment manufacturers
- Non-governmental interest organizations

Contact info@sea-intelligence.com to discuss how we may assist you with tailor-made analysis.

How to subscribe to Sea-Intelligence Sunday Spotlight?

Send an email requesting the subscription to info@sea-intelligence.com stating whether you want a quarter or a full year subscription. Your subscription will be available immediately, and you will receive an invoice with bank payment details, or you can pay by credit card (VISA and Mastercard).

Subscription options:

- One quarter: 600 Euro
- One-year subscription: 1,800 Euro – this is a 25% discount, equal to getting 13 weeks for free.

Copyright and Disclaimer

Editor:

CEO and Partner, Mr Alan Murphy – am@sea-intelligence.com

Analysts:

Shipping Analyst, Mr Imaad Asad – ia@sea-intelligence.com

Shipping Analyst, Mr Adam Szabo – as@sea-intelligence.com

External analyst, Mr Lars Jensen - lars.jensen@seaintelligence-consulting.com

Sea-Intelligence ApS

Vermlandsgade 51, 2

2300 Copenhagen S

Denmark

www.Sea-Intelligence.com

Tel: +45 6068 77 44 l E-mail: info@sea-intelligence.com